Independent Blogs

Why Labour lost – A view from Bradford

By Sophie Khan 

Notebook - A selection of Independent views -Saturday, 31 March 2012 at 7:04 pm

The Labour defeat at the Bradford West by-election on Thursday has come as a shock to the Labour leadership. Harriet Harman, the deputy leader of Labour, speaking on the Today programme labelled the result a “real last-minute phenomenon” but that is far from the truth.
The seeds of dissent where growing for years and the dissatisfaction of the local people was evident even from recent comments posted on many of the articles leading up to the by-election. They wanted change, they wanted a future and they wanted to be heard. Labour had taken Bradford West for granted. The ease in which they had won the last three elections meant that in their minds they were invincible and unbeatable. They had forgotten about the needs of the voters and the distrust felt towards the local Labour leaders who, by all accounts, had disconnected from the local people and local problems. Labour was by name alone and the people of Bradford West had had enough and I don’t blame them.
The lack of employment opportunities, the failure to secure investment and the inability to tackle the continual negative stereotypes were damaging the lives of many. Bradford had become a society within a society, closed off from the rest of Britain, dysfunctional and struggling to survive. To Labour, this insular society was championed as a success, but if you compare Bradford to cities such as Leicester, which embraces diversity and is recognised even by the Queen for its achievements as a multi-cultural hub of Britain, it is difficult to see why Labour had come to such a conclusion.
They don’t seem to share this view now though, and have turned to point their fingers directly at the people of Bradford themselves. Harriet Harman also adds that there is now “a particular problem in Bradford” and Ed Miliband is also reported to have said that he will be visiting the constituency in the coming weeks to “talk to people there about why this result happened”. It is staggering to hear that the Labour party can not recognise that they are the particular problem in Bradford and should be looking to address their own flaws before pointing their fingers at others. Labour’s failure to engage and connect with the local community has seriously damaged their relationship and as a result the people of Bradford West lost their faith in Labour’s politics as being a solution to their problems. They needed a change in leadership, in direction and in their future and that is why they voted against Labour.
The elitist political model that Labour has now become does not serve communities such as Bradford West well and if Labour can not embrace its traditional grass roots in such communities then it will find it hard to win back support of its one time stronghold. If Bradford West is to be reclaimed then Labour must change, the local people must be valued and for once their futures taken seriously. This blip can be overcome by the right candidate and with Labour’s commitment to deliver what it promises. Labour is the only party for the people of Bradford West. Their voices have now been heard loud and clear and a message has been sent that they will not be ignored. It is now time for Labour to sit down and listen and change for the future.
Image credit: Getty Images
http://blogs.independent.co.uk/2012/03/31/why-labour-lost-a-view-from-bradford/

Law Gazette - Comment

Some ‘rights’ have limitations in a democratic society

Thursday 29 March 2012 by Sophie Khan

The right to follow one’s religious beliefs has been recognised in this country for centuries – and following the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 those rights are now protected by law.
Article 9(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 enshrines that ‘everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion’, which includes the right to ‘manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance’.
Some Muslim women have chosen to manifest their religion by wearing the hijab and, more recently, the niqab, a garment that covers the whole face, apart from a narrow slit through which the eyes can be seen.
In a recent ruling, which is reported to be the first of its kind, a Muslim woman was asked to stand down from serving as a juror. The woman, who was otherwise wearing a tight grey jacket, had veiled her face. Judge Aiden Marron QC, sitting at Blackfriars Crown Court on an attempted murder trial, felt that in that particular case it would be ‘preferable’ for her to remove her veil so that her face was exposed during the trial.
The veiled woman refused and another member of the jury pool was then sworn in in her place. There was criticism of the judge’s decision by some Islamic organisations, which did not understand the reasoning behind his ruling. His ruling was based on the judicial guidance on the wearing of veils in court issued by the Equal Treatment Advisory Committee in 2007. In those guidelines it states: ‘Each situation should be considered individually in order to find the best solution in each case. We respect the right for Muslim women to choose to wear the niqab as part of their religious beliefs, although the interests of justice remain paramount.’
It was in the interest of justice that the judge asked the veiled woman to stand down. The advocates may have been hindered in putting their case to her due to the barrier the veil creates and made it hard for the veiled juror to participate in the trial. As justice must be seen and done it would be difficult for the judge to justify the swearing-in of a veiled juror when her presence could be detrimental to the performance of the advocates – and ultimately raise questions as to whether a fair hearing has been held.
Excluded or barred
It is possible that the veiled woman will be able to sit as a juror on another trial, as there is no indication that she has been excluded or barred from jury service due to her veil. Her right to wear the veil has been respected by the judge and the correct exemption has been applied in her case. It should be recognised by the judge’s critics that some ‘rights’ have limitations which are necessary in a democratic society. For that reason, not all acts of exclusion should be classed as discrimination.
Regardless of that, many will see this ruling as part of a growing intolerance towards religious rights in favour of ‘miltant secularism’ and compare this incident with the experiences of Christian believers who have been excluded from their places of work. Their cases are to be heard in Strasbourg, hopefully this year, and will test the strength of article 9 in application to Christianity.
They argue that they have been denied the right to manifest their religious belief by not being allowed to wear a cross at work and have faced religious discrimination as a consequence. The government is challenging their claims, insisting that the wearing of a visible cross is not a generally recognised form of practising the Christian faith.
But a similar argument could be made against the wearing of the niqab, which is not a ‘requirement’ of core Islamic observance.
It seems to me that if an exemption can be made for a veiled woman to be excused from her civic duty then surely similar provisions can be made to accommodate those who wish to wear a cross.
Sophie Khan is a solicitor-advocate at GT Stewart, London
http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/opinion/comment/some-rights-have-limitations-democratic-society 

Solicitors Journal -Kettling

Kettling will not always be lawful 26 March 2012

By Sophie Khan
Recent cases reinforce the proposition that police containment must only be used in exceptional circumstances, says Sophie Khan

On 15 March 2012 the European Court of Human Rights delivered the long-awaited judgment in Austin & Others v UK (Application nos 39692/09, 40713/09 and 41008/09). The court held “that there was no deprivation of liberty” and that “since article 5 is inapplicable, there has been no violation of that provision in this case”.
The judgment has come as a disappointment to those who believe that the police tactic of containment, or ‘kettling’, is deployed to dissuade individuals from exercising their right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. However, if closer examination is given not just to the Strasbourg judgment in Austin but also the recent Court of Appeal case of R (Hannah McClure and Joshua Moos) v The Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [2012] EWCA Civ 12 and the case of Castle & Others v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2011] EWHC 2317 (Admin), there is a clear message contrary to that view. All three judgments, based on their own specific facts, recognise the fundamental right to freedom of assembly and instead of giving the police a ‘green light’ to curtail the right to protest are laying down strict guidelines for them to follow.
In Austin, for example, it is held that: “It must be underlined that measures of crowd control should not be used by the national authorities directly or indirectly to stifle or discourage protest, given the fundamental importance of freedom of expression and assembly in all democratic societies. Had it not remained necessary for the police to impose and maintain the cordon in order to prevent serious injury or damage, the ‘type’ of the measure would have been different, and its coercive and restrictive nature might have been sufficient to bring it within article 5.”
The same theme can be seen in the judicial review brought by McClure and Moos who challenged the strategic decision made by the Metropolitan Police to ‘kettle’ the Climate Camp based outside the Climate Exchange Building in Bishopgate on 1 April 2009. The judgment of the Master of the Rolls states: “We have concluded that a decision to contain a substantial crowd of demonstrators, whose behaviour, though at times unruly and somewhat violent, did not of itself justify containment…” and: “Containment of a crowd involves a serious intrusion into the freedom of movement of the crowd members, so it should only be adopted where it is reasonably believed that a breach of the peace is imminent and that no less intrusive crowd control operation will prevent the breach.”
An appeal against this judgment has been made to the Supreme Court which in due course will hear the arguments afresh; however, from reading of the judgment I find it difficult to see how a different conclusion will be reached, especially as the test and requirements to contain a crowd are clearly stated. The exceptional circumstances of both Austin and Moos cannot be ignored, and, had there not been a reasonable apprehension of an imminent breach of the peace in both instances, it is unlikely that containment would have been authorised.

Last resort

Containment was also authorised in Castle, again due to an imminent breach of the peace. Claims were brought by Adam Castle, Rosie Castle and Sam Eaton to challenge their containment within Whitehall on 24 November 2010. Adam and Sam were then 16 years old and Rosie was 14. All three had taken part in a demonstration against the proposed rise in university tuition fees and the removal of the educational maintenance allowance. They alleged that their detention within the containment was unlawful as “the defendant’s decision to contain and, therefore, to detain children constituted a breach of his duty under section 11 Children Act 2004” and that they were detained for an excessive period of time.
Pitchford LJ acknowledged “that the defendant... owed a statutory duty to have regard to the need to safeguard children and to promote their welfare”. However, he rejected the assertion that there had been no regard to that need and did not consider that the defendant was in breach of this duty or any of his public law duties.
Although the claims were dismissed it should be noted that the judgment provides guidance to the police if they take steps to interfere with an individual’s freedom of movement. It is held that: “The obligation upon the defendant was to avoid such action if he could. That duty required, where practicable, planning for alternatives to containment and, in any event, to minimise its impact on innocent third parties.” It goes on to say: “If the decision maker is unable to show that he could not, by taking reasonable steps, have avoided the need to use containment, or have mitigated the consequences to innocent third parties, in particular children, then he will have acted unlawfully towards them in breach of his public duty.”
This judgment reinforces the argument that ‘kettling’ is the last resort and that the police must scrutinise their actions if they are to stay within the law. The perception that police containment will always be lawful is not prescribed by case law and peaceful protests should continue to be held without fear or favour.
Postscript:Sophie Khan is a solicitor-advocate specialising in actions against the police at GT Stewart Solicitors (http://gtstewart.co.uk)
http://www.solicitorsjournal.com/story.asp?storycode=19829&encCode=675077316BC1060233JTBS737226611

Tasers in Times Law

Tasers - time to restrict their use?

Sophie Khan

Published at 12:01AM, February 23 2012

Police officers must ensure that stun guns are used to the letter of the law or they may see face criminal charges

The incident in London last Sunday resulted in a 25-year-old man being Tasered and shot by firearms officers in the early hours of the morning, raising again the issue of the reasonable use of force by police. Was the dual use of the stun gun and firearms justified and proportionate?
The Taser-related incident in South East London on February 19 occurred within days of Amnesty International urging stricter limits on the use of the Taser stun gun.
Last week, it was reported that a 43-year-old man, Johnnie Kamahi Warren, had been Tasered twice by a police officer in Dothan, Alabama and died within hours due to breathing difficulties. Amnesty International has recorded that since 2001 there have been at least 500 people who have died in America following the use of the Taser either during arrest or while in jail.
The Taser stun gun, which is classified as a prohibited weapon under Section 5 of the Firearms Act 1968, should only be used when officers are facing violence or threats of violence of such severity that they would need to use force to protect the public, themselves or the subject. Outside this remit the use of the Taser would become unlawful and a potential breach of Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which states that “no one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, or punishment”.
Media reports tend to suggest that force on this occasion was disproportionate and reaffirm the need for a review of the ACPO Taser Policy and Operational Guidance.
Since 2008, there have been a significant number of cases that have involved Taser use on those suffering from mental health issues. Although the Guidance specifically states that caution should be taken against use on certain groups of people, in reality little regard is given to such warnings.
This is evident by the Channel 4 report last year, which found that there had been on average an increase of 130 per cent in Taser use across most police forces. It is difficult to see how the police can justify such an increase in one year, further weight to the view that the Taser is being used disproportionately and that we should take on board Amnesty International’s call to restrict the use of Tasers.
Tasers have a part to play in modern policing and if their use is correctly regulated and monitored then they could be an effective deterrent in the fight against crime. But until that time police officers must take appropriate steps to ensure that their use is to the letter of the law otherwise they may see themselves subject to criminal charges.
Sophie Khan, solicitor-advocate specialising in Actions Against the Police at GT Stewart and represents a number of people Tasered by the police 

http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/law/article3328524.ece